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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
The state of democracy in the Dominican Republic cannot be 
analyzed exclusively according to how closely its 
institutional functions and procedures conform to classic 
ideals of representative democracy.  Instead, the Dominican 
Republic can perhaps best be described as a “contested 
democracy” in acknowledgement of certain of its 
characteristics: informal forms of citizenship, conflicting 
governability, and precarious institutionalization.  The 
quality of its democracy must be viewed in the context of its 
ability to offer basic civil guarantees, such as access to 
security and social justice.  This paper focuses primarily on 
these factors, which determine actual governability in the 
Dominican Republic.  
 
An understanding of the challenges facing Dominican 
democracy requires an examination at the structural and 
policy levels.  The issues to be considered include 
mechanisms for the resolution of conflicting interests among 
actors with asymmetrical access to power, as well as the 
resilience of nondemocratic institutional cultures within the 
police, political parties and other key institutions.   Such 
conditions typically inhibit democracy but could be 
redirected to reach the “positive equilibrium” that John 
Bailey discusses elsewhere.  
 
Security and judicial policies tend to be directed from the top 
down, but an official attitude that recognizes and nurtures 
local initiatives and reforms that involve a variety of 
strategic stakeholders could be more effective.  Similarly, the 
Dominican state must take greater efforts to identify positive 
role models at the local and national levels, starting by 
 
 See John Bailey, "Security Traps and Democratic Governability in 
Latin America: Dynamics of Crime, Violence, Corruption, Regime and 
State," in Marcelo Bergman and Laurence Whitehead, eds., Criminality, 
Public Security, and the Challenge to Democracy in Latin America 
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), 2009. 
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establishing a more responsible law enforcement system that 
guarantees fair sanctions against predators and compensation 
to the victims of criminal acts.  These steps could have a 
dramatic impact on curbing violence, crime and injustice.  
The greatest challenge for the Dominican state, however, is 
to disrupt the growing nexus between criminal elements and 
political, economic and governmental actors. 
 3 
THEORIES OF DEMOCRACY  
 
Many scholars consider Latin American democracies to be 
“works in progress” due to the regimes‟ hybridism or even 
schizophrenia in terms of objectives and content, and, 
ultimately, quality and performance.  Flawed democracies 
are commonly associated with various forms of violence 
which, while they differ from the predominantly political 
violence states used against citizens under previous 
authoritarian regimes, complement the re-creation of 
discriminatory state violence against socially deprived 
sectors.  Contemporary violence, most often citizen against 
citizen, occurs within a faulty system of law enforcement 
and civil guarantees, but it also derives from violent methods 
of social cleansing implemented by governments in fighting 
crime. Confrontations between angry, frustrated and/or 
marginalized citizens against their governments and political 
elites sometimes overshadow the recurrent violence wielded 
by politicians against their opponents.  In this 
“democratization of violence,” to use Dirk Kruijt and Kees 
Koonings‟ term, a “variety of social actors pursuing a variety 
of objectives act on the basis of coercive strategies and 
methods.”2  Publicly and privately, violent actors move in to 
areas where ineffective local governance has left a vacuum, 
legal authorities are absent and the rule of law is precarious.  
These conditions operate not on the margins of 
contemporary democratic regimes, but at their very center, 
striking at core values. 
 
                                                             
2 Dirk Kruijt and Kees Koonings, “Introduction: Violence and Fear in 
Latin America,” in Koonings and Kruijt, eds., Societies of Fear, the 
Legacy of Civil War, Violence and Terror in Latin America (London: 
Zed Books, 1999), 11.  See also Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt, “Armed 
Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America: A 
Survey of Issues and Arguments,” in Koonings and Kruijt, eds., Armed 
Actors, Organized Violence and State Failure in Latin America (London: 
Zed Books, 2004), 8. 
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How does this picture fit into understandings of what 
democracy is or means?  In general terms, the debate 
regarding contemporary democracy in Latin America can be 
simplified into two camps:  On the one side, the promoters of 
a minimalist conception of procedural democracy in the 
tradition of Schumpeter‟s (1950) and Robert Dahl‟s (1971) 
polyarchic conception of political participation; and, on the 
other, critics of the objectification of existing democracies.    
 
Some scholars consider Dahl‟s and Schumpeter‟s theories to 
be examples of elitist democracy.  More than three decades 
after the end of a generation of dictatorships and 
totalitarianism, these critics argue, elected governments have 
not been able to eradicate fraud, clientelism or pacts among 
political elites based on corruption and “opacity.”3  In this 
vein, Linz and Stepan emphasize the discrepancy between 
political elites‟ values and behavior and the legitimating 
procedures and formal structures necessary to protect the 
collective interest.
4
  Such procedures and structures validate 
the limited power legitimately delegated to political elites 
and should translate, in the words of John Bailey and Roy 
Godson, into the democratic exercise of governability: “the 
ability of a government to allocate values over its society, to 
exercise legitimate power in the context of generally 
accepted rules.”5 For Bailey in particular, various indicators 
serve as measurements of democratic governability: a) the 
separation between public and private interests and activity; 
                                                             
3
 See James Petras and Steve Vieux, “The Transition to Authoritarian 
Electoral Regimes in Latin America,” Latin American Perspectives 21 
no. 4, 1994, http://lap.sagepub.com/content/21/4/5.full.pdf+html.  
4
 See Juan J. Linz, and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic 
Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and 
Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
1996).  
5
 John Bailey and Roy Godson, “Introduction,” in Bailey and Godson, 
eds., Organized Crime and Democratic Governability: Mexico and the 
U.S.-Mexican Borderland (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 
2000).  
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b) concordance, rather than separation, between the letter of 
the law and social practice; and c) citizens‟ preference for 
legal transactions over illegal ones.  To these concepts we 
should add the state‟s ability to prevent and protect citizens 
from social, political and unregulated violence.  From the 
perspective of liberal democracy, the precarious balance, or 
“negative equilibrium,” of these factors in Latin America and 
the Caribbean renders its democratic track record more 
aspirational than real.
6
  Political scientists, in fact, have 
labeled many of these regimes “non-liberal democracies.” 7 
 
Critics of the objectification of existing democracies argue 
that Latin American democracies reconstitute themselves in 
practice through formal and informal channels concurrently 
with the erosion of civil liberties, preservation of vestiges of 
authoritarianism or populism, and increasingly precarious 
social conditions for the majority of citizens.  Such 
democracies operate within a framework of increasing 
insecurity and entrenched official impunity that 
compromises quality of life.  Guillermo O‟Donnell notes a 
kind of authoritarian/democratic hybridism among the 
emerging African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean 
democracies, describing them as having an asymmetric state 
presence incapable of guaranteeing the rule of law within 
their territories.
8
 
 
This line of thinking has led to a focus on the processes by 
which criminal and violent agents take over government 
institutions and permeate society, conditioning the limits of 
                                                             
6
 Bailey, "Security Traps.”  
7
 See Carlos A. Flores, El estado en crisis: crimen organizado y política, 
Desafíos para la consolidación democrática (Mexico City: CIESAS, 
2009). 
8
 See Guillermo O‟Donnell, “On the State, Democratization and Some 
Conceptual Problems: A Latin American View with Glances at Some 
Postcommunist Countries,” World Development 21, no. 8, 1993. 
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democratic regimes in Latin America and the Caribbean. 9   
In such settings, state power is co-opted, ceded or shared 
with non-state, sometimes criminal and violent, actors.  
Rather than a lack of institutional presence in the strict sense 
of the term, these societies are characterized by the 
emergence of alternative authorities, actors and arbiters that 
renegotiate power, both public and private, formal and 
informal, licit and illicit.10  Elke Krahmann suggests the 
meaning of governance in these states: “the fragmentation of 
political authority in seven dimensions: geography, function, 
resources, interests, norms, decision making and policy 
implementation. Together they help to distinguish 
governance from government as ideal concepts of 
fragmented and centralized political authority.”11 These 
dynamics obviously complicate the rules and framework of 
democracy. At the very least, the state loses its exclusive 
control over the legitimate use of violence – the basic 
definition of a state, as Max Weber and Thomas Hobbes 
proposed.  
 
Explaining the evolution of Latin American states into their 
current form is also a challenge.  Bailey describes a pattern 
of “negative equilibrium”12 around dynamics toxic to 
                                                             
9 See Enrique Desmond Arias, Drugs and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: 
Trafficking, Social Networks & Public Security (Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina Press, 2006).  See also Luis Jorge Garay S., et al., 
Drug Trafficking, Corruption and States: How Illicit Networks 
Reconfigure Institutions in Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico (Bogotá: 
Fundación Método, 2011).  
10 See Anne Clunan and Harold Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces: 
Alternatives to State Authority in an Era of Softened Sovereignty 
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2010).  
11 Elke Krahmann, “National, Regional, and Global Governance: One 
Phenomenon or Many?” Global Governance 9, no. 3 (2003): 323-346. 
12 John Bailey proposes a two way (polarized) model of interaction 
between public security and democratic governability: on the one hand, a 
positive equilibrium in which “the state and regime operate mostly 
legally and in the main to ameliorate problems of public security”; and 
on the other, a “negative equilibrium, where there is a marked 
 7 
institutional strengthening: rampant corruption, criminal 
violence, and the endemic weakness of justice and security 
systems.
13
   Other social scientists claim that the multiplicity 
of violence is not a sign of the failure of the region‟s political 
systems but rather a creative force engendering distinctive 
systems of governability.
14
   
 
Desmond Arias and Daniel Goldstein suggest that 
contemporary democracies can only be understood through a 
historical analysis of the political practices, cultures and 
institutions leading to the conflation of illicit actors and state 
agents.
15
  In my view, terms such as “violent democracies,” 
“neo-medievalisms” and emergent “alternative authorities” 
may seem like oxymorons, but in fact they reflect the 
concrete realities of Latin American democratic states and 
regimes.
16
  For a large number of emerging or evolving 
democracies, violence precedes and accompanies processes 
of social change and modernization.  Understanding Latin 
American democracies, therefore, means understanding the 
interaction of these social and political components in ways 
that constantly redefine the relations between state and 
society, processes of integration and exclusion, formal and 
informal institutions, violence and crime.  Tensions and 
ruptures within contemporary democratic regimes, even if 
they do not manifest themselves in the revolutions and coups 
                                                                                                                            
discrepancy between formal law and norms of civil society behavior, 
where citizenry tolerate or promote formally illegal exchanges and the 
state and regime act as principal engines of crime, violence and 
corruption.” Bailey, “Security Traps,” 253-256. 
13
 Ibid., 260-261 
14
 See Enrique Desmond Arias, “Understanding Security Networks, 
Political Order, and Politics in Latin America,” in Anne Clunan and 
Harold Trinkunas, eds., Ungoverned Spaces, 116. 
15
 Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, Violent 
Democracies in Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2010). 
16
 For an exploration of these concepts see Arias and Goldstein, Violent 
Democracies; Clunan and Trinkunas, Ungoverned Spaces; John Rapley, 
“The New Middle Ages,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 3 (May/June 2006).   
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of earlier eras, reflect countersystemic tendencies that 
challenge and undermine democratic liberal principles and 
aspirations, as is evident in the recent experiences of 
countries such as Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Venezuela.  A 
process of “negative adaptation” characterizes these cases, as 
political elites attempt different subterfuges to withstand 
challenges to their interests, including constitutional reforms 
as a means of arbitration.   
 
The same process of “negative adaptation” exists in the 
Caribbean, this essay argues, in contrast to some analysts‟ 
favorable views of the robustness of democracy in the region 
in post-colonial, post-authoritarian and parliamentary 
guise.
17
 A critical element of this outlook is the health of the 
political party system, especially in the Dominican Republic.  
Countries with a tradition of centralized (presidential) 
governments, such as the Dominican Republic (which 
inaugurated the democratic boom in Latin America in the 
late 1970s), suffer from chronic institutional deficits 
including lack of bureaucratic transparency, excessive use of 
                                                             
17Ivelaw Griffith maintains that: “With some notable exceptions, such as 
Cuba and Haiti, the contemporary history of the Caribbean reveals the 
region to be a bastion of democracy both in terms of elections and in 
terms of press freedom, human rights protections, and other key 
democracy variables.  Especially in the English-speaking Caribbean the 
endurance of democracy is partly due to the possession of strong 
„democratic assets,‟ compared to societies in other parts of the world 
with similar socio-economic profiles.”  See U.S. Congress, House 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, New Directions or Old Path? Caribbean 
Basin Security Initiative: Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 
2009).  See also Jorge I. Dom nguez, “The Caribbean Question, Why 
Has Liberal Democracy (Surprisingly) Flourished?” in Jorge I. 
Domínguez, Robert A. Pastor, and R. DeLisle Worrell, eds., Democratic 
Politics in Latin America and the Caribbean (Baltimore, MD: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1998), 14; and Anthony Harriot, “Police 
Transformation and International Cooperation: The Jamaican 
Experience,” in Niels Uildriks, Policing Insecurity: Police Reform, 
Security, and Human Rights in Latin America (Lanham, MD: Lexington 
Books, 2009), 23.    
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coercive force against citizens, and the absence of clear 
public policies regulating the relationship between state and 
society and citizens themselves.
18
  Despite the superficial 
vitality of political parties in the Dominican Republic, the 
political class shows an increasing incapacity to establish 
basic consensus around critical issues of public interest or to 
form strategies and policies of governance. This shortcoming 
seriously threatens democratic governability by reducing the 
capacity of the governed to question those who govern them, 
as well as diminishing public trust in democratic institutions. 
 
SECURITY AND JUSTICE: CRUCIAL COMPONENTS IN 
A DEMOCRACY 
 
The fundamental importance of the safety of person and 
property, and the principle of equal treatment under the law, 
make security and justice crucial components in the 
performance and endurance of democracy.  Several factors 
measure a state‟s success in providing these values: (a) a 
collective sense of safety and fairness; and (b) the existence 
of formal channels enabling citizens to participate in the 
process of institutional reform.  For decades, aspirations 
toward security and justice have propelled social agency and 
guided collective action around the world, but in democratic 
regimes they come together and can become problematic. A 
rights-based, democratic state project that guarantees social 
welfare accords security and justice the same value as 
                                                             
18
 See Rosario Espinal, “El proceso democrático dominicano: avances, 
retrocesos y riesgos,” in Robinson Salazar, ed., Los riesgos de la 
democracia en América Latina (Mexico City: Editorial Libros en Red, 
2003).  See also 
Catherine M. Conaghan and Rosario Espinal, “Unlikely Transitions to 
Uncertain Regimes? Democracy without Compromise in the Dominican 
Republic and Ecuador” (University of Notre Dame: Kellogg Working 
Paper no. 139, May 1990).  For an analysis of the implications for 
democratic regimes see Lee J. Alston, Thráinn Eggertsson, and Douglass 
Cecil North, Empirical Studies in Institutional Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
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economic and social welfare; that is, as basic factors for the 
consolidation of a democratic regime.  The construction of 
this new institutionalism requires recognition that the 
asymmetric structure of society leaves out or, more to the 
point, informally incorporates certain social groups; for 
example, underprivileged youth, whose social and political 
marginalization can result, in turn, in their criminalization.  
In such societies, the political rhetoric of democracy, 
elevated to national discourse, has little connection to the 
restricted political rights exercised by poor, “second-class” 
citizens.
19
 
 
In countries such as the Dominican Republic, the 
construction of citizenship and the consolidation of the rule 
of law mediate between offer and demand in the areas of 
justice and security.  The democratization of security and 
justice can be viewed from three perspectives, therefore: (1) 
as a fundamental prerogative of citizens; (2) as a standard for 
measuring the strength of a state‟s institutions; and (3) as a 
measure of the quality and maturity of a democracy.  The 
deterioration of citizens‟ security, in turn, owes a great deal 
to increased levels of violence and criminal penetration of 
the state.  
 
The discussion that follows begins with a brief overview of 
the recent history of democracy in the Dominican Republic, 
focusing primarily on the tensions between the democratic 
state and society.  It examines public attitudes toward and 
expectations of the state‟s and government‟s ability to 
provide safety, fairness and protection.  The data comes from 
Latinobarómetro and Latin American Public Opinion Project 
(LAPOP) surveys.  
 
                                                             
19
 This issue was an integral part of the peace negotiations to end the civil 
conflicts in Central America in the mid 1990s.  A shift in the security 
paradigm occurred within the framework of state restructuring and social 
and political recomposition in these countries.     
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THE EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF DEMOCRATIC 
INSTITUTIONALISM  
 
The Dominican Republic is widely considered to be one of 
the most stable examples of democracy in the hemisphere 
since the country‟s post-authoritarian transition in the late 
1970s.
20
 Its stability may be related to the absence of military 
governments for more than half a century and the decline in 
the political clout of the armed forces.  Accepting this 
scenario at face value, however, glosses over an important 
fact: The country‟s transition from a civilian but 
authoritarian regime did not involve a decisive rupture with 
previous political and military elites.   The transition to 
democracy in the Dominican Republic was characterized by 
the continuity of a culture of centralized power, coercion and 
personalism.  This elitist model of transition, based on pacts 
that can be traced back to the end of the Trujillo regime, 
ensured either alternation or continuity in power, and tended 
to replicate itself during successive episodes of political 
change (with the exception of the 1965 revolutionary 
moment), perpetuating these actors‟ dominance of state 
power structures and granting them impunity.  
 
The transition from authoritarianism to democracy in a 
context of institutional precariousness had a double effect.  
On the one hand, the disarticulation of state agencies, despite 
the centralizing power of the executive, accentuated the lack 
of coordination within the bureaucracy and fomented the 
privatization of basic state functions, including justice and 
security.  This in turn incentivized the autonomy of public 
actors working for their own benefit.  On the other hand, as 
was noted above, the transition maintained the continuity of 
past practices, especially relating to security.  Successive 
                                                             
20
 Jana Morgan, Rosario Espinal, and Mitchell Seligson, Cultura política 
de la democracia en República Dominicana, 2010: consolidación 
democrática en las Américas en tiempos difíciles (Santo Domingo: 
USAID/Santo Domingo, 2010), 29-30. 
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governments transferred critical responsibilities to the 
security forces, making them the absolute designers, 
controllers and promoters of their roles and missions.  
 
The delegation of security policy to the security forces 
drastically limited citizen‟s ability to check and balance the 
security and judicial sectors.  Even the process of 
“liberalization” that accompanied the emergence of 
Dominican democracy failed to reconfigure critical state 
attributes.  The absence of public security policies is an 
example of one such vacuum, made worse by the lack of an 
effective, professional and accountable security bureaucracy.  
These impediments have blocked Dominicans‟ aspirations 
for truly democratic reform of the security and justice 
sectors. 
 
Political and institutional changes have only accentuated the 
adversarial relationship between the state, the emerging 
political system and Dominican society.   Of course, some 
segments of civil society have been able to take advantage of 
opportunities to promote their common interests, channel 
collective action and contribute to democratic 
institutionalism.
 21
 An extensive literature addresses these 
processes;
22
 fewer works, however, explore their underlying 
                                                             
21
 See Lilian Bobea, “De la protesta a la propuesta: articulaciones entre 
los movimientos populares y el estado en República Dominicana,” in 
Margarita López Maya, ed., Lucha popular, democracia, neoliberalismo: 
protesta popular en América Latina en los años de ajuste (Caracas: 
Nueva Sociedad, 1999), 179-208.  See also Laura Faxas, El mito roto: 
sistema político y movimiento popular en la República Dominicana, 
1961-1990 (Mexico City: Ediciones Siglo XXI, FUNGLODE, FLACSO 
República Dominicana, 2007); and César Pérez and Leopoldo Artiles, 
Movimientos sociales dominicanos: identidad y dilemas (Santo 
Domingo: Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo, 1992). 
22
For a more complete review of these issues see Rosario Espinal, 
Autoritarismo y democracia en la política dominicana (San Jos , Costa 
Rica: Editorial Argumentos, 1987); Rosario Espinal, “Republica 
Dominicana. El retorno del PRD al poder,” Revista Nueva Sociedad 178 
 13 
dynamics, and their implications for the formal and informal 
institutionalism that shapes and sustains governability. 
Neither NGOs nor social movements (i.e. popular protests) 
have done much to change the essence of civil society‟s 
confrontational relationship with the state and the political 
system, whose underlying rationale is precisely 
dissatisfaction with a system lacking constructive 
mechanisms to channel popular discontent and contestation.  
As other Dominican scholars, have noted, however, the 
emergence of informal politics not only changed the 
discourse of the masses (from a concept of social class to one 
of popular struggle), but also contributed to democratization 
based on the rights of citizens. This is something that the 
disorganized and debilitated state was in no condition to 
offer.23  
 
THE “RULERS AND SHAKERS” OF THE NEW 
DEMOCRACY 
 
Although elections offer a space for negotiation that would 
seem to facilitate popular pressure for reform, Dominican 
political parties have usually operated with a binary logic of 
cooptation followed by distancing;24 one they attain power, 
in other words, they cease to serve and represent the masses. 
That trend creates a rupture between the government and the 
governed, fueling a repetitive cycle of expectation, distrust 
and loss of legitimacy.  At the same time, the neoliberal state 
has transferred responsibilities to non-state actors (churches, 
NGOs, the private sector) and, by doing so, eroded its raison 
d’être as the main guarantor of basic rights and social justice.   
 
                                                                                                                            
(2002), 15-22; Conaghan and Espinal, “Unlikely Transitions"; and Faxas, 
El Mito Roto. 
23 See Pérez and Artiles, Movimientos sociales. 
24 The greatest momentum for political change took place in 1996, when 
the newly elected liberal government of Leonel Fernández introduced 
state reform that included reform of the justice system and the election of 
the country‟s first-ever independent Supreme Court.   
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To what extent, however, do civil society innovations bypass 
inefficient state institutions?  And can the system of political 
and institutional representation within the state be enhanced 
to invigorate democracy in the Dominican Republic?  
Centripetal and centrifugal forces in the links between 
society, state and politics require an examination of the 
interactions and engagements among these components, 
especially with regard to the provision of security and civil 
guarantees.   
 
The Dominican public is not completely apathetic with 
regard to cooperation with the security forces, in spite of the 
negative record of police-civilian relations.
25
  Only 37% of 
Dominicans had a positive opinion of the country‟s security 
forces in 2010;
26
 nevertheless, around 75% of residents 
interviewed in the poorest neighborhood of Santo Domingo 
in 2006 said they would collaborate with the police and 
Ministry of Interior in crime prevention in despite the 
widespread perception (90% of those interviewed) of 
unequal treatment by these institutions. The overwhelming 
perception of insecurity among Dominicans – one of the 
highest in Latin America, along with Venezuela, El Salvador 
and Ecuador – could explain this inconsistency.27   
 
A SYSTEM THAT WORKS OR JUST ANOTHER DEAD 
END? 
 
Another factor to consider in the ambiguous relationship 
between the state and its citizens is the importance 
                                                             
25
 See Lilian Bobea, “Organized Violence, Disorganized States,” in 
Enrique Desmond Arias and Daniel M. Goldstein, eds., Violent 
Democracies in Latin America (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2010).  
26
   t     r  etr  (Madrid: Banco de Datos ASEP/JDS, 2010), 
http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/latinobarometro.jsp.   
27
 According to the 2010 Latinobarómetro poll, only 26% of Dominicans 
feel secure in the country and in their neighborhoods. Latinobarómetro 
(2010), 95. 
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Dominicans place on institutional performance.  Dominicans 
rank second after Venezuelans among Latin Americans in 
believing that the state has the capacity to solve problems.28  
Despite this prima facie vote of confidence in state 
institutionalism, however, Dominican political culture 
remains characterized by a considerable degree of 
clientelism and personalism, as well as presidentialism.  
Further evidence of this “executive” orientation is the degree 
of trust Dominicans express in the head of state (69%) over 
political parties (33%), or key institutions such as the 
police.29  Even given a strong party system, clientelism 
reinforces the personalist nature of Dominican politics, 
favoring a strong government hand (authoritarian or 
militaristic) in administrative, economic and, especially, 
security crises.  Sixty percent of Dominicans consider it 
acceptable for the government to overrule laws, Congress 
and democratic institutions to solve problems, a far greater 
percentage than the Latin American average (39%).30 
 
“Executivist” democracies reflect a rupture between norms 
concerning the rule of law and actual practice and, in turn, 
call into question the robustness of the political system and 
democratic regime.  The subordination of the state as the 
universal representative of the rights of citizens to the 
political power personified by the party leadership inevitably 
erodes the legitimacy of the constitutional order.  Between 
2008 and 2010, indices of support for the democratic system 
and satisfaction with the functioning of democracy decreased 
on several counts in the Dominican Republic, accompanied 
by parallel increases in support for the benefits of 
                                                             
28 Latinobar metro (2010). 
29 Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República 
Dominicana, 2010, 31. 
30 Latinobarómetro (2010), 37. 
 16 
authoritarianism in ensuring security and the statement that 
Dominican democracy was at risk.
31
 
 
These results are a sign of frustration with the way the 
system operates and may reflect a process of “negative 
adaptation” of citizens to current sociopolitical conditions.  
As we have seen, despite Dominicans‟ commitment to 
democracy, their support for democratic forms of 
government has eroded in recent years, along with their 
satisfaction with the democratic regime.
32
  The indicators 
used in comparative surveys reveal a negative view of 
institutional performance, especially with regard to the 
provision of justice and security and efforts to reduce 
corruption.
33
  LAPOP‟s 2010 AmericasBarometer poll, for 
example, compared average support for the political system 
with questions about such issues as the “likelihood that the 
courts of justice would deliver a fair judgment”; “respect of 
citizens toward the political institutions of the country”; “if 
they considered that their basic rights were safeguarded by 
the political system”; the “extent to which they felt proud of 
living under such a political system”; and their confidence in 
the system.  Although 53.9% of Dominicans answered these 
questions positively, the results represented a 4% drop from 
2008.  Nearly half of respondents indicated that the political 
system did not meet their expectations, and their answers 
reflect a growing sense of unfairness, especially with regard 
to access to justice. 
 
Since 2000, the Dominican Republic has experienced 
positive institutional change, most notably in the sphere of 
                                                             
31
 Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República 
Dominicana, 2010, 58-59. 
32
 According to the most recent Latinobarómetro poll, 63% of 
Dominicans declared their support for democracy in 2010, down from 
67% in 2009 and 75% in 2008.  
33
 Morgan, et al., Cultura política de la democracia en República 
Dominicana, 2010.  
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justice.  The process has included the modernization of the 
criminal justice system, including the penal system; the 
development of a more democratic legal framework; 
protection for individual rights through the revision of the 
Penal Process Code; more extensive training for judges; and 
the development of alternative mechanisms of conflict 
resolution, such as neighborhood and community 
prosecutors.
34
  Many problems with the justice system 
remain, however, especially with regard to access to the 
resources that provide these guarantees. 
 
For example, in the National District – the capital and its 
environs – drug violations represent 40% of all infractions.  
Most of these violations involve a myriad of minor street 
dealers and drug users, meaning that the criminal justice 
system spends a disproportionate amount of time prosecuting 
economically disadvantaged segments of the population that 
depend on informal illicit economies to survive.
35
  In the 
words of one NGO representative: “The majority of people 
convicted in this matter generally are not the kingpin or 
high-ranking leaders but instead people who are used as 
„mules‟ and ultimately people who do not have the capacity 
to pay for legal assistance.”36  The prosecutor for the 
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(22,183) of total cases entering the judicial system.  Of this number, 
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involved in drug crime.” See, Kaeilis Bautista, “Casos de Droga 
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National District corroborated the fact that “the majority of 
the important cases of narcotrafficking in the National 
District are conducted by private lawyers; the ones that make 
the headlines, all have private defense.”37 Cases that involve 
individuals with few resources are handled by the National 
Public Defense Office (Oficina Nacional de Defensa Pública, 
ONDP), which in 2009 had only 184 public defense 
attorneys despite the high demand generated by such cases, 
which constitute 60% of all criminal cases in the Dominican 
Republic and should employ at least 400 public defense 
attorneys.  
 
Exceedingly high levels of impunity compromise the 
effectiveness and legitimacy of the justice system, which is 
lenient toward public functionaries who have committed 
fraud as well as toward individuals in the private sector who 
engage in acts of corruption.  A 2003 study by the 
Dominican Republic‟s Foundation for Institutionality and 
Justice (FINJUS) found that of 130 corruption cases that 
went to trial, only six ended in judicial decisions and only 
one in non-jail sanctions against the accused.  “In the last 20 
years,” the study concluded, “nobody has received a criminal 
conviction for corruption.”38   The impunity of corrupt 
officials stands in stark contrast to the vulnerability of petty 
drug dealers and exposes a double standard in the criminal 
justice system.  These phenomena cannot be attributed only 
to institutional failures, but also to an institutional culture 
that functions according to an inverse, or even perverse logic 
of subsuming the collective interest to the individual. 
 
                                                                                                                            
Predominan en la Defensa Publica. Clave Digital, Dominican Republic, 
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Dominicana” (FINJUS, Participaci n Ciudadana, Enjus, 2006), 
http://www.finjus.net/documentos/Archivos/Documentos/Libros/Vision
%20Poblacion%20Justicia%20Penal.pdf 
 19 
Dissatisfaction with security conditions is also rampant in 
the Dominican Republic.  In 2010, only 7% of Dominicans 
surveyed believed that national security was good or very 
good, a figure nine points below the Latin American average 
(16%).
39
  In part this can be explained by a “shock effect”; 
after enjoying levels of violence below the rest of Latin 
America for many years, Dominican society registered a 
sharp rise in violent deaths beginning in 2001.
40
  The number 
of homicide victims more than doubled, from 12.8 per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2001 to 26.3 per 100,000 in 2006.
41
  
To face this crisis of insecurity, President Leonel Fernández 
(1996-2000 and 2004-2012) designed and implemented a 
public policy known as the Democratic Security Plan (Plan 
de Seguridad Democrática, or PSD), which succeeded in 
reducing the national rate of violent deaths from 25.2 per 
100,000 inhabitants in 2004 to 22 per 100,000 in 2007.
42
  By 
2008, however, violent crime rates had crept back up, 
especially in low-income neighborhoods.  These 
developments fuel a culture of insecurity that emphasizes 
self-protection among the poor and the privatization of 
security among the rich.  It reflects the disappointment of 
early expectations, especially among the poor, that the state 
could guarantee security through the PSD, and increased 
public skepticism of its real capability to deal with macro-
social problems.  
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 Procuraduría General de la República (Attorney General‟s Office), 
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In recent surveys, Dominicans identify crime and insecurity 
as more serious problems than poverty and unemployment.
43
  
The 2010 Latinobarómetro poll found a high perception of 
insecurity among Dominicans of all social classes, who 
believe that life in the country grows more dangerous every 
day.  Over the last few years, according to data from LAPOP 
2010, the perception of insecurity has varied but remained 
consistently elevated (68% in 2001; 75% in 2004; 79% in 
2006; 59% in 2008; and 73% in 2010).
 44
  Only 10% of 
Dominican citizens claim to feel safe in their own 
neighborhoods, compared to 37% of Nicaraguans and 17% 
of all Latin Americans.
 45
  Individual perceptions of 
insecurity are also high among Dominicans, only 8% of 
whom feel safe in assuming that they will never be the 
victim of a crime (compared to 22% of Nicaraguans and 
19% of Guatemalans). 
 
Not surprisingly, rising fear of crime has coincided with 
doubts about the police practices employed to counteract it.  
More than 42% of those interviewed in 2006 believed that 
the National Police did not adequately control delinquency.  
Residents of the most populous and crime-ridden 
neighborhoods of the National District interviewed in 2005 
and 2007 expressed the same sentiment:  
 
We are so fearful among ourselves that we cannot 
face the criminals and given that the police do not 
help us we find ourselves forced to make friends with 
these criminals, that is, to be friendly with them, for if 
we try to confront them they kill us and the police will 
not do anything about it.
 46
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By 2006, 16% of Dominicans reported having been the 
victim of a crime.
47
  Fifty-six percent of these victims 
admitted that they had not reported the crime to the police, 
believing that it was “useless” to do so – up from 43% in 
2004.
48
   In 2005, the government‟s official statistical survey, 
ENHOGAR, revealed that 79% of home break-ins were not 
reported to the police, along with 74% of holdups and 88% 
of thefts.
 49
 
 
The low rate of calling in the police is a clear indication of 
public distrust both in the capacity (efficiency and 
efficaciousness) and integrity of this institution.  Forty-two 
percent of the victims of auto part thefts agreed that “the 
police will not do anything” to resolve such crimes, a 
sentiment echoed by 58% of victims of vehicular theft and 
71% of victims of burglaries.
50
  Another survey in 2006 
revealed that 60% of Dominicans expressed little confidence 
in the police,
51
 a situation often aggravated by fear.  
Research conducted in the National District in 2005 found 
overwhelming distrust of the authorities, in some cases as 
high as 95%, depending on the specific history of conflict 
between the neighborhood and the police.  As some residents 
stated: 
You are safer if a delinquent robs you than if the 
police bust you.  The police bust you, plant drugs, 
arrest you, open a criminal file, and give you two, 
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three, or four years in jail, and you come out and you 
are a parasite to society . . . Because you are from 
Capotillo.
52
   
 
WEAK INSTITUTIONS:  CRIMINAL STATETROPISM 
AND DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY 
 
Dominican democracy is plagued by the links sustained by 
bureaucrats and political elites with unregulated actors who 
promote new forms of violent and illicit practices that are 
often not only political, but also criminal.  In interviews in 
the barrios of Santo Domingo in 2005, poor residents spoke 
of the social, political and economic changes that have 
resulted from increased insecurity, pervasive drug trafficking 
and police corruption in their neighborhoods. Some 
individuals benefit from these activities, but overall they 
have a negative impact on social capital and community 
cohesion.  Many informants stressed that they were afraid to 
leave their houses after dark; changed their route to work to 
avoid drug sales points and dangerous spaces; and restricted 
the freedom of their children to protect them from violence.  
Torn between intimidation by gang members and fear of the 
police, many see neither in black and white terms.  Public 
security policies continue to dichotomize criminals and the 
police, but the reality is that for the most vulnerable citizens, 
illicit activity often has certain beneficial effects and official 
security policy a negative impact. The same dynamic holds 
true for police, judges, customs officials and military officers 
drawn into illicit activity.     
Given their lack of options, slum dwellers find ways to adapt 
to the fear, violence and intimidation that drug gangs bring to 
poor neighborhoods.  Insofar as adaptation allows them to 
overcome the absence of licit economic alternatives, it can 
appear beneficial, but when citizens embrace values and 
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identities that accept illicit and sometimes violent activities, 
social cohesion and social capital grow weaker.  From the 
state perspective, the success of organized criminals in 
providing poor neighborhoods with alternative forms of 
security, livelihood, morality and even identity is a threat to 
institutional democracy.  Unlike common criminals, 
moreover, organized criminals actively seek out agents of the 
state for co-optation.   
This essay coins the term statetropism to describe the illicit 
entrepreneurship of corrupt, often violent officials who 
protect illicit businesses.53  Instead of confronting the state, 
the new criminality builds a network of alliances within and 
around it.  The state is thereby put in the untenable position 
of being responsible for deterring crime while at the same 
time being exploited by an organized criminal elite.  
Statetropism, in other words, institutionalizes complex 
criminality within a putatively democratic system.  
The new statetropic criminality is crucial to guaranteeing the 
predictability and robustness of illicit businesses. In some 
cases, it can function as a moderator of violence through the 
rationalization and administration of illegal activities.54  This 
calming effect, however, may not trickle down to the street 
level, where gang rivalries often erupt into violence.  The 
absence of professionalism within the ranks of the police 
manifests itself in the wanton use of extra-legal force and 
rampant corruption.  The ability of the police leadership to 
curb officer vigilantism is an indication of the systematic 
nature of excessive police force, rather than the idiosyncratic 
response of a few officers.  
                                                             
53 The notion of statetropism is a neologism based on the concept of 
heliotropism, which refers to the orientation of certain plants toward the 
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54 Bailey, “Security Traps.” 
 24 
National statistics corroborate the extent of official violence.  
In the first year of the Plan for Democratic Security (2005-
2006), the number of individuals killed by the police 
dropped 33%, representing a decline in police shooting rates 
from 4.80 per 100,000 inhabitants to 3.24 for the period.55  
This decline was reversed in 2006, when a new police chief 
took office.  That year, the US State Department denounced 
400 killings by police in the Dominican Republic.  For the 
last 10 years, police actions have caused between 16% and 
20% of total violent deaths in the country.56 
This situation is the result of a discriminatory system of 
justice that punishes minor infractions with lethal force and 
harsh penalties but barely sanctions white-collar crime.  This 
pattern relies on a double-track mechanism of dissuasion: on 
one hand, a pervasive institutional culture that implements 
the symbolic and conferred use of power under a system of 
agreed-upon rules; and on the other hand, an informal and 
autonomous system of rules stemming from institutional 
disarticulation and disorganization. This implicit “strategy” 
contradicts any democratic policy of crime prevention and 
control but has served as the default components of a 
semiofficial National Police policy.  This approach has the 
tacit and sometimes explicit support of influential groups 
within Dominican society, who believe that only a mano 
dura (strong hand) can control criminality.  This tolerance 
for military and police violence delays the development of an 
effective counter-crime policy, even as it suggests that 
democracy has little effect on transforming engrained 
authoritarian practices. 
 
Another enduring legacy of dictatorship is the pervasive 
corruption among Dominican police and justice personnel. In 
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a 2006 penitentiary survey, 71.4% of the prison population 
reported being asked for bribes by the police to move their 
cases forward or receive better treatment while in jail.  
Seventy percent of inmates admitted paying police officers 
some form of bribe.
57
  In the poorest neighborhoods, 
perceived levels of police integrity are extremely low.  In 
2005, researchers found that 88% of residents in the 12 
barrios used as test cases for the Democratic Security Plan 
reported skyrocketing police corruption over the last five 
years.  Even a year after the PSD was implemented, 70% of 
those interviewed for the AmericasBarometer poll cited 
police involvement in criminal acts, compared to only 30% 
who thought the police were doing a good job protecting 
people.
58
 
 
Lack of trust in the police and other officials has its roots not 
only in abuse and corruption, but also in the perceived and 
documented involvement of functionaries in illicit and 
criminal activities.  Some scandals have appeared in the 
media, but local residents know of many more. Recent 
interviews reveal a public perception of involvement by 
political candidates with drug traffickers to make money and 
gain support within their communities. When these 
candidates win elections, they maintain their links to illicit 
and criminal actors in their localities.  Citizens describe a 
patron-client relationship between corrupt political 
candidates, officials and drug traffickers. One resident put 
the issue in these terms: “Politicians are the protector shield 
of narcos…. They can‟t stop the narcos, because 
narcotrafficking is political.”59 This type of opportunistic 
relationship also exists between police officers and 
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criminals: “They (the police) are speaking loud and clear 
when they are in front of a client (criminal) who owes them.  
They say, „Hey you, you did not pay me my part of the drugs 
that you sold yesterday.‟”60  Many residents agree that “the 
police receive a weekly income from the drug retailing 
business, while the narcos use the official resources to 
operate with impunity.” 61 
 
The existence of a well-rooted, violent, illicit and non-
democratic institutional subculture embedded in the security 
and judiciary sectors has obvious negative implications for 
Dominican democracy.  Pervasive practices such as these 
tend to become ingrained in a society‟s systems of values 
and institutional culture.  For example, even though the 
Dominican Republic occupies an intermediate position in 
AmericasBarometer‟s ranking of countries whose nationals 
admit being affected by acts of corruption (18%), citizen 
perceptions of corruption put it in the highest position (78%), 
above Mexico, Jamaica, and Trinidad & Tobago.  This 
suggests that Dominicans care more about the type of 
corruption that affects them indirectly – that is, high-level 
corruption – than the petty bribery of traffic cops.  At the 
same time, however, 18% of Dominicans justified bribery 
and the use of political influence for personal benefit, 
suggesting that a segment of the population recognizes and 
rewards the inefficiencies of the system.
62
  The same study 
also concludes that those who embrace the efficiency of less 
democratic political systems perceive an increase in 
corruption and feel insecure.
63
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QUALIFYING DEMOCRACY:  THE EMERGENCE OF 
COMPETITIVE AUTHORITIES  
 
The coexistence of old and new criminality in the barrios 
gives rise to what can be described as criminogenic 
ecosystems; that is, socioeconomic, political, cultural and 
institutional arrangements that allow confluence, overlap and 
conflict among licit and illicit, old and new, public and 
private actors and activities. Statetropism and criminogenic 
ecosystems affect the collective interest, social cohesion and 
spatial structure of democracies and their constituencies.  
They are fed by public frustration with justice and security 
systems that give non-state actors a greater role in providing 
protection and social goods.  Criminogenic ecosystems 
develop locally, in the most vulnerable areas, but often 
project themselves in the national arena, where they intersect 
at different levels with political, economic and bureaucratic 
elites.  They are facilitated by clientelistic practices that 
often dovetail with normal and “legitimate” ways of doing 
business among politicians and the private sector.  A process 
of adaptation occurs at the center of criminogenic 
ecosystems, actively promoted by criminal actors and 
embraced in haphazard and opportunistic ways by sectors of 
the population.   
 
Not all activities within the criminogenic ecosystem are 
violent.  With security a scarce and tradable commodity, 
criminogenic clientelism relies on the cooptation of different 
sources of insecurity, including the police itself.
 64
  These 
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adaptations have several consequences, among them shifts in 
social practices that conflict with previously agreed upon 
core values of morality and coexistence.  Growing 
inequality, scarce income opportunities and the precarious 
delivery and distribution of goods and services by local and 
national authorities propel the blossoming of informal 
activities. In this context, illicit activities, such as the sale of 
stolen merchandise, become a part of the informal system of 
self-provision of goods and services, within which drug 
trafficking is just another economic activity, albeit one that is 
intermittent and, undoubtedly, risky.   
 
Of course, all informal activity is not necessarily illicit or 
criminal.65  Interactions and exchanges among barrio 
dwellers suggest ambivalence toward illegal activities such 
as drug trafficking.  On the one hand, many understand that 
the involvement of young people and “decent” citizens in the 
micro-market for drugs corrodes morale and collective 
coexistence within the barrios and leads to the degradation 
                                                                                                                            
manifests itself in the incapacity of the state to arbiter among emergent 
social actors (i.e., popular movements) and elites.  It also helped defuse 
the crisis of hegemony that preceded the recomposition of the political 
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delincuencia juvenil en Guaricano (Santo Domingo: Casa Abierta, 
2008), 274-275. 
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and stigmatization of communities.  On the other hand, the 
dynamics of large-scale deprivation reproduce uneven 
political and social configurations, resulting in the following 
scenarios:   
 
 The normalization of the illicit.  In the words of one 
resident: “Drug trafficking, you see it daily, it is 
normal. You will see places where it‟s so visible that 
they identify themselves as businesses.  One beside the 
other, you will always see them on your way down the 
street.”66   
 
 Drug trafficking as an informal economy.  As another 
resident pointed out, “Much of the cash that circulates 
in Capotillo is linked to narcotrafficking.  Those who 
don't sell it have their own business, but everyone who 
buys from that business does it with drug money, and 
one way or another narcotrafficking reaps those 
rewards (...) In fact, in the first few days after they 
caught El Gringo (a drug dealer), that week there was a 
recession in the neighborhood, so much so that 
everyone was in bed by ten!  You felt it.”67  According 
to residents, the implications are that “The social 
abandonment of many authorities and entities involved 
in the management of these poor areas has left 
everything up in the air.  They have disconnected 
themselves from society.  [There is a] lack of 
education, of opportunity, and solutions for youth 
unemployment.”68   
 
 Complex criminality as alternative governance.  “Here 
the narcotraffickers are like a more powerful presence 
than the Dominican state.  They [the drug dealers] defy 
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the authorities; they are better armed than the military 
and the national police together.”69 
 
 Criminogenic ecosystems as social service providers. 
“They (drug dealers) are the first to respond to and 
resolve the problems of people in the community when 
something happens. They buy the coffin for the dead; if 
there is a fire, they will throw water on it along with 
everyone else.  Dealers are like that, very engaged in 
their community.”70  
 
Both criminal ecosystems and statetropism take advantage of 
and at the same time promote state disorganization, a 
condition that fundamentally undermines democracy.  As 
residents note: “Drug traffickers are more organized than the 
state.  They are already supplanting the state in the positive 
work and responsibilities that it is supposed to 
accomplish.”71  “Due to the abuses being committed, the 
tigüeres (hustlers) are getting riled up. Now there are strikes 
and mobilizations organized by these social groups, by these 
interests. Every time the DNCD (counter-narcotics 
department) hits the streets there is a strike.”72 
 
As these observations suggest, statetropism and criminogenic 
ecosystems manifest the level of deterioration of state and 
democratic legitimacy.  This condition has reached the 
dangerous point of opening niches allowing alternative 
forces of governability to capture control in some territorial 
areas and even within the state itself. 
 
The next section of this essay considers how these dynamics 
have reconfigured the relationship between the state, society 
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and political system.  These rearrangements manifest 
themselves in crucial changes in values.  Even if they do not 
result in authoritarian regressions, these dynamics have the 
potential to become antisystemic forces that justify and 
provide incentives for violence and alternative authority. 
They express shifting alternatives to state presence through 
symbiotic clientelistic relationship with violent and illicit 
actors.  For this reason, any attempt to strengthen the 
democratic system in the Dominican Republic must 
transcend formal institutional reforms and address the rapid 
transformation of the nation‟s social fabric. 
 
DOMINICAN DEMOCRACY IN CHANGING CONTEXTS 
 
In recent decades, Dominican society has experienced 
considerable change in the public and private realms.  In 
2008, the country‟s highest Human Empowerment Index 
(HEI), as measured by the United Nations, was in the 
metropolitan zones of Santo Domingo, the surrounding 
National District and Santiago.  HEI was twice as high in the 
province of Santo Domingo and four times greater in the 
National District than in the rest of the country.  The 
Collective Empowerment Index (CEI), however, was lower 
in these two metropolitan areas. This uneven distribution of 
opportunities, capacities and power is in itself conditioned by 
social and political considerations, replicating multiple 
inequities even in areas better positioned economically.
73
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As of 2005, according to UN data, the country‟s integration 
in the global economy had brought asymmetrical results for 
the majority of the population. Despite economic growth of 
between 5% and 8% since 1996, the majority of the 
Dominican population has not substantially raised its 
standard of living.  In fact, the Dominican Republic is among 
a small group of nations that has been unable to raise its 
Index of Human Development (IHD) despite economic 
growth, reflecting the ongoing incapacity of the Dominican 
political elite to promote the well being of those it represents.   
 
Not surprisingly, 90% of Dominicans the UN interviewed in 
2008 said that political parties only defend the interests of 
certain groups or their own organizations.  The report 
attributes the country‟s growing poverty and lagging human 
development to the “sparse commitment of the political and 
industrial national leadership to collective progress during 
the last decades, as well as the absence of a social 
empowerment pact with the majority of Dominican 
society.”74 
 
The absence of a social pact has led to sharpening social 
inequality under the neoliberal policies implemented by 
liberal and even populist governments.  These strategies have 
generated more poverty and reduced the ranks of the middle 
class.  In 2010, two-thirds of Dominicans surveyed 
considered the country‟s economic situation to be very bad, 
despite the relatively favorable growth of the national 
economy.  The year before, Dominicans headed the list of 
                                                                                                                            
serve to strengthen people‟s capability to better take charge of and 
improve their own human condition.”  See UNDP, “Informe sobre 
desarrollo humano, República Dominicana 2008: desarrollo humano, una 
cuesti n de poder” (Santo Domingo: Oficina de Desarrollo Humano, 
2008).  
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Latin Americans who reported serious difficulty meeting 
their basic needs with the income they earned.
75
 
 
At the same time as the neoliberal economic opening 
heightened inequality, global trends accelerated Dominican 
transnationalism through free trade zones, tourism, 
migration, remittances and the growth of a services 
economy.  All of these transnational factors created 
opportunities for the country to enter the buoyant illicit 
transnational economy, including the movement of drugs, 
arms, money and people.  Organized crime took advantage 
of these conditions to create niches of corruption and 
illegality.  The expansion of the national drug trafficking 
arena contributed to the formation of a micro-industrial drug 
trade primarily (though not exclusively) in marginalized 
barrios where legal alternatives for generating income are 
scarce, especially for unemployed youth.  
 
The abrupt emergence of these activities in the first few 
years of the present century, as well as competition between 
drug retail sites, incited a type of violence never before 
experienced in Dominican society. As in the past, 
governments deployed a mano dura strategy to mask the 
structural and administrative disorganization of security 
forces.  Rather than curbing the violence, the state‟s response 
further exacerbated it, as random collective raids in poor 
neighborhoods led to the persecution and extermination of 
individuals perceived to be delinquents.  Many poor 
Dominicans viewed this reactive, punitive and socially 
discriminatory approach as a state policy of social cleansing.  
The police and armed forces returned to their Cold War 
mode of eradicating “enemies of the state” wholesale.  
Overall, the state‟s inability to control the new criminality 
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highlighted the absence of preventive public policies to 
control crime and insecurity. This trend changed somewhat 
only in 2005, with the implementation of the Democratic 
Security Plan. 
 
CONCLUSIONS:  DECONSTRUCTING DEMOCRATIC 
GOVERNABILITY IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 
 
The beginning of this article cites the state‟s inability to 
guarantee the rule of law as one of the critical challenges to 
the Dominican democratic system.  As Dominican 
sociologist Leopoldo Artiles argues, since independence the 
Dominican state has been unable to “structure a state of 
rights constitutionally backed and guided by a liberal 
democratic constitution.”76 Despite democratization and 
modernization, this problem persists today. 
 
Complex processes of social, economic and political change 
are defining the course of democratic development in the 
country. The traditional adversarial relationship between 
civil society, the political system and the state that 
challenged the post-authoritarian transition is projected today 
in more complex terms.  The equally traditional lack of 
separation between the public and the private (a trait 
characteristic of the dictatorship period) is aggravated in the 
twenty-first century by the cooptation of critical areas of the 
state by unregulated and illicit private actors.  This 
cooptation is propelled by:  a) the readiness of organized 
crime to take advantage of state resources by penetrating the 
political sphere; b) a shrinking of the state and the transfer of 
many of its responsibilities to non-state actors; c) the 
emergence of parallel governability that contests democratic 
rules by institutionalizing informal practices between private 
and public actors; and d) the transmutation of traditional 
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values as a result of adaptation and resilience to new 
challenges to survival. 
 
Today, major antagonism between political parties and civil 
society is not only tied to politicians‟ abandonment of 
rhetorical promises, but also to the parties‟ role in promoting 
political, social and even criminal violence.  Political parties 
contribute implicitly or explicitly, as do other private 
unregulated actors, to the deterioration of social welfare and 
peaceful coexistence within socially excluded communities 
and sectors of the Dominican population.   
 
Each and every one of these developments impacts 
Dominican democracy in unprecedented ways, raising a 
number of questions:  If not political parties, NGOs or the 
traditional community leadership, who are the new 
interlocutors in Dominican society?  What political agendas, 
if any, do these emerging actors defend?  Whose interests do 
they represent?  What kind of institutional framework can 
support the current links between society, the state and the 
political arena?  Given the disorganization of the state and 
the fragmentation of interests, values and motivations within 
society, what institutional resources beyond violence can the 
state deploy to guide social change? 
 
These questions suggest two hypotheses, both of which 
require further study.  First, in “young” democracies such the 
Dominican Republic, the state struggles to impose or regain 
its authority and legitimacy in areas of historical 
abandonment.  Other actors rival the state as “alternative 
authorities” by providing services, goods and protection, and 
use the informal economy and clientelistic networks to 
construct a new social and spatial order and rules of 
engagement.  More than coercion and intimidation is 
involved in these interplays; public adaptation and 
acceptance also play a role in giving these actors new 
legitimacy. 
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A second hypothesis is that the state has been a passive 
actor, allowing non-state actors to generate an alternative 
governability through its propensity to surrender 
responsibilities and functions to private actors (NGOs, 
churches, community-based organizations, private security 
firms) and those who circumvent public scrutiny (corrupt 
police and military, drug traffickers, gangs, criminals). 
 
In either case, reversing institutionalized practices such as 
corruption, statetropism and anomic clientelism will require 
more than mere institutional reform.  Successful reform will 
imply an understanding of how these processes manifest 
themselves and inform official and informal institutions, as 
well as the possible implications and outcomes of their 
dissolution, especially in terms of political and social 
vacuums they create.  Finally, it is important to identify the 
winners and losers in this asymmetrical competition.77  
Reaching this level of comprehension could help 
stakeholders and policy makers address problems through 
more concrete and credible institutional transformations.   
                                                             
77This argument elaborates on Merilee S. Grindle article, “Despite the 
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(Harvard University: KSG Faculty Research Working Papers Series 
RWP01-021, January 2001. 
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